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Nishitani the Prophet
Jan Van bragt
A religio-philosophical existence on the basis of non-ego.1
1 Nishitani Keiji, ChosakushQ (Collected Works), Tokyo: SObunsha, 1986-1992, 
Vol. 17, p. 113. References to the Collected Works will be indicated parenthetically by 
volume and page number in the text. In the translations I shall sometimes, for brevity’s 
sake, take the liberty of inserting a phrase or clause taken from the context—always 
taking care not to betray Nishitani’s intention.
2 “World” being a word Nishitani was very fond of and which he often knew how 
to load with fresh meaning.
I DO not believe I have a right to call myself a disciple of Nishitani 
Sensei. If I had been a disciple, he would have had to send me back, 
time after time, to my koan—the Mu (“emptiness”) koan—without 
my ever being able to crack it. On the other hand, it would be an 
understatement to say that I learned a great deal from Nishitani Sensei. 
It would be truer to say that Nishitani was one of the decisive influences 
in my life, and that it is he, together with Takeuchi Yoshinori, who 
“pulled me in” out of my cozy Western-Christian “world”2 and into 
the wide but uncanny spaces of Eastern thinking—and that by his per­
sonality, more even than by his philosophy.
This essay is a token payment of an impayable debt. If it does not 
succeed in achieving a conversation with the late lamented master, I 
hope at least to make his silent presence felt. The reason for trying to 
evoke Nishitani Keiji as a “religious prophet” and a living embodi­
ment of the Buddhist-Christian dialogue is because that, of course, 
is where my own existential interest is centered, but is not, I firmly 
believe, a betrayal of, or a mere subjective sidelight on, the man.
For one thing, he himself is responsible for that direction of my 
interest and, 1 could add, of my very life. It is of course true that 
Nishitani saw himself, and wanted to be seen by others, as a 
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“philosopher,” without any further labels (except, maybe, that of 
“werdender Buddhist”).3 Still, there can be no doubt that, for him, 
“philosophy,” as the quest for true reality, must culminate, and trans­
cend itself, in religion. It is only on the level of religion that true reality 
reveals itself as it is, and that true subjectivity is reached. “It is 
philosophy that has traditionally asked the most basic questions about 
the human as such. However, when it comes to a still more holistic 
standpoint, not the sole thinking standpoint of philosophy, it is 
religion that presents itself” (18:12).
3 This reminds me of the only time, in the 25 years of our acquaintance, that 
Nishitani ever showed his displeasure in no uncertain terms. It was when I had written 
that “Nishitani provided Zen with a modern fundamental theology?* He clearly did 
not want any part of the label “theologian.**
4 The remainder consisting of more “technical** philosophical treatises on various 
philosophers (Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Kant, Schelling, Nietzsche, Nishida, 
Tanabe, etc.) and philosophy of culture, autobiographical pieces, occasional essays, 
and analyses of poetry. On this point, there is a marked difference between Nishitani 
and his mentor, Nishida KitarO, whose only two direct treatments of religion are to be 
found at the beginning and the very end of a career dedicated to ontological and 
epistemological investigations.
The words I put at the beginning of this essay as a kind of motto 
were meant by Nishitani as a description of the existential meaning of 
emptiness or of the Buddhist life, but I submit that, in those words, 
Nishitani has bequeathed to us the tersest possible formulation of the 
very core of his own existence. And a quick look at the Collected 
Works reveals that, roughly, about two thirds of Nishitani’s literary 
output deals, directly or indirectly, with religious themes.4 Religion 
was, indeed, constantly at the heart of his philosophical and existential 
concerns. Still, nobody who had the privilege of knowing him at 
all could have been in the least tempted to describe him as a “pious 
soul,” much less a narrow-minded advocate of any particular religious 
viewpoint. But, on the other hand, characterizing him simply as a 
philosopher of religion—something which he undoubtedly was, to an 
eminent degree—would not be entirely just, since it would give no hint 
of the depth of his existential involvement, nor of the breadth of his 
idea of religion.
It is thus extremely important to see Nishitani’s preoccupation with 
religion in the right perspective: that of his “life project.” Nishitani 
saw it as his mission in life, his task as a philosopher, not only to 
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diagnose the fundamental problems of human life in the present age, 
but to point the way to their solution. In his earlier works (up to 
ShtlkyO to wa nanika, 1961), as is well known, Nishitani diagnosed 
nihilism, and its alliance with scientism, as the fundamental problem of 
our times, and indicated as the remedy the radicalization of that “rel­
ative nothingness” into “absolute nothingness” (emptiness)—seeing 
thereby religion, especially Buddhism and Christianity, as the only 
force capable of overcoming that nihilism and leading people to the 
standpoint of emptiness. It cannot be doubted that this remained 
basically Nishitani’s position up to the very end.
Still, as I want to indicate here per t rarisen n am, this does not render 
the question redundant whether Nishitani’s thought in his later years 
showed any significant evolution—a question I have not found treated 
anywhere so far. I myself feel far from ready to answer that question, 
and will offer here only some impressions gathered from a perusal of 
more recent writings. I was struck by how seldom the word “nihilism” 
appears in these texts. It may be a sign that religion as such is more 
than ever taking center stage—religion of which he now said, “Its 
absence constitutes the fundamental nature of the present age” 
(18:193). Buddhism and Christianity are now submitted to detailed 
scrutiny as to their fundamental nature and their relationship to the pre­
sent age. It is as if Nishitani wants to ascertain whether and to what 
degree these religions contain the power to save humanity. Here, the re­
cent encounter of the two is fully endorsed, even as it is scrutinized in 
its turn as to its capacity for the same task. It is on these three topics 
that my attention will focus in this essay: Nishitani and Christianity, 
Nishitani and Buddhism, Nishitani and the Interreligious Dialogue.
Before I settled on these topics, however, other possible themes 
had crossed my mind. Of these, two had looked especially fitting for a 
commemorative publication. One, “Nishitani as heir to both cultures, 
East and West,” feeling perfectly at home in both and able to switch 
from one to the other, or combine elements of both, at any moment. 
A feat which, to my knowledge, no Westerner has ever been able to 
achieve and which the younger generations of Japanese scholars are in­
capable of, since postwar education does not produce the kind of 
familiarity Nishitani shows, for instance, with Chinese literature and 
Neo-Confucian thought. I was recently struck again by two examples 
of that extraordinary versatility. He describes, very aptly, the moral 
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situation among the American elite as “the mappO (latter day) of Puri­
tanism” (17:242). In a following talk, where the topic is Buddhism and 
the audience Buddhist, he approaches the question of conscience from 
the side of Socrates, Jesus, Augustine, and Descartes (17:276-283). 
Secondly, Nishitani’s love of nature came to mind as a topic. There are 
certainly in Nishitani’s writings some of the most exquisite passages on 
the existential meaning of nature I have ever come across?
But the topic that really tempted me was the one that keeps turning 
Nishitani’s thought into a koan for me. I formulate it as the “uses” of 
emptiness or absolute nothingness. This amounts, of course, to confess­
ing that I never really grasped the core of Nishitani’s thought—or, 
more generally, of the philosophy of the Kyoto School. But there it is 
and, as if that were not shameful enough, I have not even felt ready to 
formulate my difficulties in any systematic fashion. There is, however, 
a sentence by Nishitani himself that consoles me somewhat. In the 
course of an explanation of emptiness as the principle of Buddhism, he 
once declared: “To Westerners, what I just said must sound very 
strange and hard to understand, but that is not really surprising. But I 
believe that one day understanding will dawn on them” (17:109). 
While feeling the blast of it directed at me, “Van Bragt only,” I am 
nevertheless impressed by the supposed universality of that “to 
Westerners,” and this gives me the courage to jot down, in a desultory 
fashion and with a show of self-confidence I am far from feeling, a few 
of my problems and misgivings, trusting that they are not irrelevant to 
my theme, which is after all about mutual Auseinandersetzung between 
East and West.
I have already had occasion to remark how in Nishitani the tradi­
tions of East and West come together in close and familiar proximity 
and continuous dialogue. In this encounter many connections are 
made, the most fundamental of which might be that between (Western) 
being and (Eastern) nothingness or emptiness. This, of course, pre­
destines the thought of Nishitani—and, larger, of the Kyoto School as 
a whole—to an important historical role as a vehicle of encounter in 
the present juncture, where East and West “are thrown into one 
another’s arms,” not only just in Japan but worldwide. A first ques­
tion here might be to ask the extent this philosophy has succeeded so
5 For two examples, see 17:60-63 and 18:24-25.
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far in finding understanding in the West, and in playing its role as 
bridge. But, a more fundamental and, indeed, critical question would 
be: How can this philosophy play its role as a bridge between East and 
West most effectively? By the quiet persuasive power of its present im­
pressive form? Or rather by being taken apart, critically analyzed in all 
its parts, and patiently built up again in that wider dialogue of East and 
West which was partly triggered by its own existence? The former may 
be effective in its own way, but I fear that without the latter, more pain­
ful, process, it will not really bear fruit, at least not in the West.
In view of the vastness of the operation and the subtlety required, it 
is not at all likely that Nishitani’s pioneering attempts can have succeed­
ed yet in connecting or merging the two traditions together in all the 
right places and angles. It is too early to tell. A major problem is of 
course that unlike the images suggested by metaphoric language, such 
as the re-attaching of a severed arm, in this case no original unity ever 
existed. Nor does a blueprint exist for us to follow. What then can 
serve as a criterion of success? If anything can be said at this early 
stage, it might be that, in the encounter and symbiosis, the respective 
riches and dynamics of the two traditions should not be lost in the pro­
cess but, on the contrary, enhanced and deepened. This brings about my 
first problem: I do not succeed in “seeing” that in the “absolute 
nothingness” of the Kyoto School, which purports to be a higher syn­
thesis of nothingness and being, negation and affirmation, the original 
dynamics of Western being is really and fully preserved.
Would not the name “absolute nothingness” denote, after all, a 
preponderance of the negative? And if so, a preponderance on which 
level? On the level of human existence? As a logical priority? Or an 
ultimate preponderance in the first metaphysical principle? I have no 
difficulty in seeing the priority of negation in a religious path, over 
against the natural clinging of the human heart to itself and things; or 
in admitting a priority of negation in logic, over against the equally 
natural tendency of human reason to objectify. And I am of course 
seduced by the “winds of freedom” which emptiness blows into the 
halls of philosophy and religion, and the texts where Nishitani, in 
almost lyrical terms, brings out the absolute freshness of the immedi­
ately present thing and the bottomless freedom of the subject on the 
field of emptiness. But, I never succeed in grasping the point in emp­
tiness whereon negation turns into affirmation, deconstruction into con­
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struction, (religious) detachment into (metaphysical) grounding, 
detachment into love.
Or, to try out a last formulation, I do not see how the evident virtues 
of emptiness could contain or render superfluous the traditional virtues 
of being. From the reading of Nishitani’s later texts I somehow have 
the impression—although I feel uncomfortable in saying this now that 
the author can no longer refute me—that Nishitani himself seems to 
acknowledge this implicitly to some degree. For instance, in his criti­
ques of Buddhism, to which we shall come later, the things Nishitani 
finds lacking in Buddhism could all be subsumed under the category, 
“virtues of being.” And in the text wherein he submits present society 
to the most explicit analysis (14:3-39), he deplores the loss in our times 
of several things which elsewhere are associated with being and appear 
to be made problematic by a religiosity based on emptiness: the idea 
that some things are sacred (not merely a universal sacredness of all 
things); discrimination, especially the “essential distinction” between 
animal and human; thinking of things as substances with their own ir­
reducible being rather than as mere functions. Finally, in his medita­
tions on the conscience of the individual as the basis of trust in human 
relations (17:229-287), Nishitani insists that this presupposes in the in­
dividual a “fixed point,” which he then describes as the solitary stand 
of the individual before (the Confucian) heaven or God, and which he 
also associates with Buddha-nature, saying: “There is somewhere in 
the human something immutable” (17:202). Here, he appears to 
presuppose an individual whose radical openness in emptiness does not 
preclude a moment of closure. I am inclined to interpret in the same 
line a formulation of his which I like very much: “a ‘non-ego’ wherein 
the other is present (ereignet)99 (17:11). Herein the symmetry in the 
negation of self and other appears to be broken through, and in the 
“self and other not-two” of emptiness, the accent appears to be on the 
necessary counterpart: “self and other not-one.”
Lastly, I would have liked to develop the theme of “Nishitani, the 
radical with the ever youthful, future-oriented spirit.” In the above, I 
have already used the word “prophet,” and I really believe that only 
this epithet covers adequately Nishitani’s stance towards Christianity, 
Buddhism, and the encounter of the two. Throughout his many talks 
to religionists, an urgent exhortation to “listen to the call of the 
future,” with “an independence, in a sense, from the past” (17: 188-
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189) runs like a golden thread.
It is in not being exclusively bound to the past, but in being 
directed onward, in intending the future, that the present is 
the present, different from the past. ... It is only by being 
open to an always new future that the present obtains the 
meaning of the present, is not dead but alive. (17:188 and 
18:195)
1 am convinced that it is important to rethink [the tradi­
tional ways and doctrines] in light of the problems of today. 
Young people should do so daringly. It does not matter if 
they sometimes miss the mark. (17:228)
Out of our new experience of life, we must return the 
religions and sects to the original source out of which they 
originated: the real religious needs of the people. ... To 
start anew from the needs found in the human condition as 
such . . . and thereby to thaw out, through life itself, what 
has petrified. . . . (17:125 and 128)
Nishitani Sensei clearly saw it as his mission to convince Japanese 
religionists of the newness of the problematics of contemporary society 
and of the depth of the crisis this constitutes for the traditional 
religions. He was convinced that none of the traditional religions, as 
they are today, is able to present a solution to the problems of contem­
porary humanity, but equally convinced that it is only religion that can 
save humanity for the future. He therefore calls the religions to reform 
themselves radically, so as to become able to meet the present dangers 
of humanity head-on. What he demands from the religions is nothing 
less than an “en/werden” (un-becoming): “to let go of the tradition in 
a process of growth, and through this growth to find an original return 
to the power that built the tradition” (18:203).
Just how radical a reform Nishitani has in mind can perhaps be seen 
most clearly in his consideration of the two fundamental characteristics 
of the modem age: science and secularization. He demands from the 
religions: do not sidestep these issues, do not try to negate or down­
play the picture of humanity and the world presented in them, but 
assume them totally, live through them into a new kind of religiosity.
I will have occasion to touch on the problem of secularization later, 
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and can suffice here with a quick look at the attitude demanded from 
religion apropos the world view offered by science. Science presents a 
picture of a dead world, without any teleology or inner directedness 
toward God or the human. The religions up to now have not really 
faced up to this world view, but Nishitani insists: “We must have 
the courage to admit that the spiritual basis of our existence, that is, 
the ground from which all the teleological systems in religion and 
philosophy up to now have emerged and on which they rested has been 
completely destroyed, once and for all. Science has descended upon the 
world of teleology like an angel with a sword.”6 We must, then, “take 
science upon ourselves as a fire with which to purge and temper the 
traditional religions and philosophies.”7 The religion of the future 
must be a religion that “dares to think existentially of science” and 
which “accepts the universe with its feature of bottomless death as the 
place for the abandoning of oneself and the throwing away of one’s 
life.”8 “To face the problem of science on that basic level is a task for 
the present. ... I think that thereby religion will come to show in a 
true sense new possibilities for the future” (6:294).
I will digress here again with a personal reflection. I greatly admired 
Nishitani for the radically of his thought, and I fear, with him, that 
religion will not regain its necessary grasp on our contemporaries 
unless the religions pass through a radical reform. Still, I cannot help 
experiencing the picture of religion which Nishitani thereby paints as 
“uncanny”: a religion of the hero, the superman; a religion that 
uproots one and sets one on one’s way, but in no sense becomes a 
home; a religion where the “form is emptiness” is pushed to its ex­
treme without any visible return to “emptiness is form”; a religion of 
“barren heights,” a moonscape. In this sense, I would call Nishitani’s 
religion nearer to that of Hisamatsu Shin’ichi than to that of Suzuki
♦ ’’Science and Zen,” Eastern Buddhist, Vol. I, No. 1 (1965), p. 85 (the original 
Japanese text appeared in I960; cf. 11:227-261). Truly apocalyptic language, befitting 
a prophet!
7 Ibid., p. 87.
8 Ibid., pp. 86 and 91. It is a moot question whether Nishitani intends any kind of 
“retractatio” when he later writes, for example, “We humans cannot existentially live 
as our own standpoint the standpoint of science’* (14:33; 1962); or again: “It is natural 
that the human is absent from the world of science, but if we stay on that standpoint, 
we cannot, finally, solve the problem of the human” (6:343; 1966).
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Daisetz. I can then appeal to Takeuchi Yoshinori’s considerable pic 
torial talents to express what I mean:
The tone of Suzuki’s religiosity is that of a mountain with 
forests and coppices at its base, interspersed here and there 
with lakes and bogs. And even near the top we still find fields 
of flowers, which lend the whole a poetic sphere. Hisamatsu’s 
Zen thought, on the contrary, gives one the impression of fac­
ing the towering rock walls of the Eiger, a lone and forbid­
ding peak.”9
I. Nishitani and Christianity
The dilemmas of present-day culture are bom out of Christianity, 
and cannot be overcome without reference to Christianity—but a 
Christianity gone through the crucible of Buddhism.10
/ think that. . . the fundamental concepts of Christianity ... as
well as the traditional attitudes towards them, are today pn
the necessity of a radical re-examination.11
Here it appears necessary, as a preliminary and without any inten­
tion of studying the problem in depth, to ask the question of Nishi­
tani’s religious affiliation. Was Nishitani a Buddhist? From the Western 
view of religious affiliation or belonging, this question can only be 
answered by a very un-Western “yes and no.” By Japanese stan­
dards, Nishitani was a Buddhist all right. He had an affiliation with a par­
ticular Zen temple, where his funeral took place, where he practiced 
zazen for a long time. He was rooted, deeply and affectionately, in 
the Buddhist tradition, and in 1963 confessed: “I have gradually come
’ Takeuchi Yoshinori, “Sei o koeru mono” (Beyond the Holy), in Fujiyoshi Jikai, 
ed., Hisamatsu Shin'ichi no shQkyO to shiso, Kyoto: Zen Bunka Kenkyflsho, 1983, p. 
128. This might suggest that Hisamatsu may have influenced Nishitani, but 1 do not 
remember Nishitani ever quoting Hisamatsu and in my copy of the Festschrift for 
Hisamatsu, I find the annotation (by myself): “Strange. No contribution by 
Nishitani!”
10 The first part of this sentence is taken from the Translator’s Introduction to 
Religion and Nothingness, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982, p. xxxvii.
” Nishitani Keiji, “A Buddhist Philosopher Looks at the Future of Christianity,” 
The Japan Christian Yearbook, Tokyo: Kyobunkwan, 1968, p. 109.
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to think things with the Buddhist categories of thought. ... I have 
gradually come near the Buddhist way of thinking” (20:185). Still, 
Nishitani never completely identified with Buddhism, often maintained 
a certain third-party distance. He once said that he can be called a Bud­
dhist only because in Buddhism such non-exclusiveness or “looseness” 
is allowed. On the same occasion, apropos of Tanabe Hajime’s having 
described his position with respect to Christianity as at the same time 
belief and unbelief, he revealed the depth of his own involvement in 
Christianity:
I have the impression that I understand Tanabe’s problem 
very well. I myself am in a similar situation. I do not feel 
satisfied with any religion as it stands, and I feel the limita­
tions of philosophy also. So, after much hesitation, I made 
up my mind and have become a werdender Buddhist (a Bud­
dhist in the making). One of the main motives for that deci­
sion was—strange as it may sound—that I could not enter 
into the faith of Christianity and was nevertheless not able to 
reject Christianity.12
12 In Kuyama Yasushi, ed., Sengo Nippon Seishins hi (Spiritual History of Postwar 
Japan), Nishinomiya: Kirisutokyd Gakuto KyOdaidan, 1961, p. 194.
” A very practical sign of Nishitani’s sympathy with Christianity was his encourag­
ing endorsement of the propagation of Christianity in Japan. “Since in Western 
civilization, Christianity has been a very important and powerful force, it seems to me 
that it would be good if the Christian foundations would also be part of Japan’s adop­
tion of Western culture . . . and I hope that it [Christianity] will develop so as to have 
a more powerful base among the Japanese people” (“A Symposium on Buddhist-
To describe Nishitani’s attitude towards Christianity we need, I 
believe, at the least the following qualifiers: an incredibly wide 
knowledge, a deep understanding aided by a high degree of empathy as 
with a tradition that is not alien to oneself, a great respect for its past 
tradition, and great expectations as to its future. Beautiful expressions 
of Nishitani’s empathic understanding can be found, for instance, in 
his view of original sin (Religion and Nothingness, pp. 22-24), on the 
idea of creation (the mystery of human existence is not sufficiently ex­
pressed in “bestowed by nature”; 21:189-195), and his warm sym­
pathy for the veneration of the Virgin Mary (21:208).13
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However, we must speak, at the same time, of an extremely critical 
attitude, which appears to have its origin in two interlacing factors. On 
the one hand, Nishitani combines in himself a double sensitivity (aver­
sion) towards the less engaging aspects of Christianity, in its makeup 
and in its historical appearance: that of the Easterner and that of the 
contemporary human being. And, on the other hand, there seems to be 
at play a kind of intolerance to, or impatience with, those traits which, 
in his view, could keep Christianity from playing in the future the im­
portant historical role which he would like to expect from it.
That Nishitani was immensely informed about Christianity does not 
mean, however, that no misunderstandings, or representations unac­
ceptable to a Christian, ever crept in. On the more esoteric level, he 
sometimes seems to confuse “virgin birth” and “immaculate concep­
tion.”14 When he writes, “The idea of perceiving God in all things of 
the world is usually rejected as ‘pantheism,’ and the correct view is 
taken to be a ‘theism’ based on a personal relationship with God,”15 
Nishitani certainly disregards a great, if not the greater, part of the 
Christian tradition. This is connected with his view of the idea of crea­
tion as representing in Christianity a fundamental separation of the 
creature from God, rather than the primordial, ontological, link be­
tween God and creature. This in turn has to do with his converting the 
“nothing” of creatio exnihilo into a substance or ground, which then 
is seen as an “iron wall” standing between God and the creature, while 
in the Christian tradition the whole sense of the expression is to ward 
off the idea that there would be a second principle or ground besides 
God. He speaks of “the being of the created being grounded upon a 
nothingness,”16 and, elsewhere (17:91-93), he presents Christianity as 
postulating (in the same way as Plotinus) two principles: God and the 
nothingness of creation—principles which were originally conceived of 
as non-substantial, but soon became substantified.
But these are minor lapses, due mostly, 1 believe, to a philosophical
Christian Encounter,” Japan Studies, No. 15, 1969, p. 2). That this was an authentic 
desire on his part was forcefully brought home to me when one day he scolded me, a 
Christian missionary in Japan, outright: “What are you people doing? Why can’t you 
be more zealous and efficient in your propagation of Christianity!’’
14 E.g., in 6:257-286.
15 Religion and Nothingness, p. 39.
14 Ibid. Cf. 13:91
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schematization. They do not blunt the power of the objections which 
Nishitani raises against Christianity—objections which we Christians 
should consider with the utmost seriousness. One well-taken critique is 
that the Christian tradition has ceded all too often to the natural in­
clination of human reason to substantify even the first principle, in 
casu God (leaving the “nothingness of creation** out of the picture 
this time). But what may have been Nishitani’s deepest-felt criticism 
of Christianity is the arrogant and exclusivistic stand of traditional 
Christianity on its own unique absoluteness, and “the firm conviction 
that a position of unwavering supremacy of faith can be ensured only 
by excluding all other standpoints from faith itself.’*17 He quotes as a 
reason why he could not become a Christian: “1 could not bring myself 
to consider Buddhism as a false doctrine**18—as required by that 
Christian stand. Fortunately enough, this objection loses much of its 
power or relevance now that this Christian attitude is, hopefully, on 
the way out. The same cannot be said, however, about the other ones.
17 “A Buddhist Philosopher Looks. . . p. 109.
18 Sengo Nippon Seishinshi, p. 194.
19 For the question of myth and demythologization, see mainly 6:257-301.
Nishitani’s basic objections to Christianity could possibly be summa­
rized in a single sentence, although such a summary would still need a 
lot of unraveling: Historically speaking, Christianity gave rise to the 
fundamental problems of the present world situation and, as it 
presents itself today, it is not able to offer a solution for these prob­
lems.
Christianity is responsible for the traditional struggle between faith 
and reason in the West, which now has developed into the mutual 
opposition of religion and science, and makes it impossible for most 
people today to come to religious faith. This is due to the one-sided, 
personalistic view of the God-human relationship and to the many 
dogmas—many of a mythological character—which it imposes. This 
mythological character is in turn a result of viewing some relations with 
God, which should be seen as universal human prerogatives, as 
historical and unique (“only Jesus has God-nature,” “virgin birth ap­
plies only in the case of Mary”). Bultmann tried to address this, but he 
did not go to the source of the problem. A unique supernatural event 
cannot be demythologized.19
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Christianity is also deemed responsible for the crisis human subjec­
tivity has been going through in modern times. That is, in the West, 
human subjectivity, in order to really come into its own, had to 
distance itself from its religious base and was thus alienated from 
religion and turned into a self-awareness of human being as a narrow 
self-enclosed (and lonely) “ego.” Nishitani admits that the modem 
idea of the free individual subject has its initial roots in Christianity’s 
idea of the personal relationship of the human individual with God, 
the idea of “the essential equality of all human beings before God, and 
the freedom in the faith-awareness of being a child of God” (17:83). 
But by this selfsame theocentric vision of the human, Christianity im­
peded the full development of human subjectivity, for “subject” is 
essentially something without a ground which would rob it of its subjec­
tivity while appearing to support it. The absolute dependence of the 
human on the divine Will does not allow real human freedom, and 
“the idea of divine providence is, indeed, a high standpoint to look 
back from at the human, but it ‘cannot return to the human’ ” 
(17:169). As a reaction, then, the Western subject in modern times 
turned to the idea of full autonomy of the individual ego. “That the 
self-awareness of the human being could only arise in that form (the 
“ego” form] is due to the fact that the preceding . . . Christian view 
of the human was theocentric and, as such, contained something that 
could not fully permit the standpoint of the subjective autonomy of 
the human being to arise” (17:84).
Thus, the full awareness of the human as such required emancipa­
tion from Christianity; it could develop only together with a movement 
toward secularization (17:83—85). What is more, Christianity not only 
did not prevent de facto the self-awareness of the Western subject from 
focusing on a self-centered ego, but contains in its very makeup the 
seeds of self-centeredness, and thus is not really able to free the human 
being from its self-centeredness. This is due to its view of history, where 
“the self-centeredness of man casts its shadow over everything,”20 
but more basically still to the priority of the will in Christianity’s view 
of God, the human, and the relationship of the two.
20 Religion and Nothingness, p. 203. For this built-in self-centeredness see ibid., pp. 
201-208, where Nishitani refers to Arnold Toynbee.
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I think that, in the Western view, the will is seen as the basic 
element of the human being. This appears especially strongly 
in Christianity. Therein lies a grave problem. The God of 
Christianity is very voluntaristic. . . . Everything falls under 
the dominion of the divine Will. Also the relationship of God 
and the human is viewed as a relation of will to will (17:26).
Christianity, of course, tends to do away with the cruder forms of 
self-centeredness, but it encourages a “self-centeredness via God?* 
“Human self-centeredness is a permanent fixture in religions in the 
West; once negated, it reappears, as in the guise of God’s chosen peo­
ple.”21 This, of course has led to the arrogance of seeing oneself as the 
“only true religion.” Thus we are back where we started. In Nishitani’s 
view, this flaw in Christianity is extremely serious, since he considers 
religion to be “the only force that can eradicate the deepest roots of 
our self-centered ego” (4:374), and ego-centered self-awareness is one 
of the central problems of our times.
II. Nishitani and Buddhism
No route exists to link the religious quest or religious needs that stir 
in the hearts of our contemporaries with the established religions 
(17:121).
I have mentioned above Nishitani’s personal affiliation with Bud­
dhism. His “identification” with, and intimate knowledge of, Bud­
dhism was clear, in spite of occasional self-deprecatory remarks such 
as: “My specialty is philosophy, in Buddhism I am an amateur” (17:3); 
“I have no right really to speak about Zen from my little bit of ex­
perience” (18:11). But there was also perhaps the desire of the 
philosopher to affirm the autonomy of his philosophy. About the fact 
that Nishida gradually stopped talking about Zen, Nishitani once 
remarked: “. . . he seems to have felt that his thought was philosoph­
ical through and through and not to be reduced to Zen and its tradi­
tional views.”22 Although Nishitani certainly never stopped talking
21 Ibid., p. 203. It may be remarked here that the apparently iron-willed Nishitani 
wages, in his works, an unrelenting battle, on all fronts and levels, against the will, 
which plays such a big role in the philosophy of his teacher, Nishida.
22 Nishitani Keiji, Nishida KitarO, trans. Yamamoto Seisaku and James W. Heisig, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, p. 25.
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about Zen—quite to the contrary, as he grew older he expressed his 
deepest insights more and more in the form of commentaries on 
“Zen words**—he can be said to have shared his teacher’s feeling.
How did Nishitani view Buddhism? It is not too much of an exag­
geration to say that, with complete disregard of its rich cultural 
heritage (with the exception of course of its philosophy and do or 
“ways”), Nishitani went straight to the core of Buddhism. “The most 
basic characteristic of Buddhism is non-ego” (17:3); “Buddhism is the 
place for being a subject that is radically non-ego, for being non-ego 
but thoroughly subject” (17:203). The focus is always on the power of 
Buddhism to overcome the natural self-centeredness of the human be­
ing, in the individual and in society.
Again, however, this “identification* and this appreciation, far from 
blunting his critical spirit, seemed rather to hone it to an ever-sharper 
edge. To tell the truth, as a Christian student of his, I sometimes 
had the impression that Nishitani occasionally “reveled” in exposing 
the problems Christianity carries in itself, especially with regard to 
modernity—problems which Buddhism was supposed not to have or to 
have preempted long ago.23 It is true that, on many occasions, he in­
dicates the advantage Buddhism has with regard to these points— 
points which I shall have occasion to mention later—and presents Bud­
dhism as at least carrying the seeds of a solution for the problems of 
the age. But any idea I might have had of Nishitani enjoying his 
criticisms of Christianity died an inglorious death the moment I 
became more acquainted with his writings and recorded talks on Bud­
dhism. I soon learned that his critique on Buddhism is no less 
“scathing,” and that, while pointing out a Christian weakness, he 
often adds in the same breath that Buddhism faces a similar problem. 
So after indicating the necessity for Christianity to rethink its idea of 
God, he points out that today Buddhism is similarly faced with the 
problem of how to conceive of the Buddha (17:285). Another example, 
with a somewhat different slant, is found in his reflections on the 
demythologization debate, triggered by Bultmann, in Christianity. The 
main thrust of his essays on this topic is, as indicated above, that 
Bultmann’s efforts are still insufficient and that Christianity is in deeper 
23 I hasten to add that this impression was only related to Nishitani’s written texts. 
There was never the slightest hint of it in personal conversation.
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trouble with its mythological character than even Bultmann realized. 
In so doing, however, he inserts a truly “Nishitanian” remark:
At the same time, the vitality which Christianity continues to 
exhibit draws its sustenance from the hidden menace this 
problem poses. In the face of the energetic and wide-reaching 
debate over demythologizing, Buddhism, in its present tepid 
and inactive state, almost seems to be like a kind of geological 
relic from the past. (6:260)M
We find here one of the most strongly-worded formulations of 
Nishitani’s indictment of present-day Buddhism. For, indeed, most of 
his criticism of Buddhism focuses on its actual situation, especially in 
Japan: its sectarianism, its lack of adaptation to the present, its aliena­
tion from real society, and so on. But let the texts speak for themselves.
[Present-day Japanese] have no religion. Buddhism and Con­
fucianism, the religions of Japan’s past, are not alive any 
longer.23
At present, Buddhism exerts practically no influence on life in 
society. . . . This is due to the fact that Buddhism has merged 
too closely into the social life, has turned into social habit, 
and has fallen into a state of inertia.” (17:79)
The present society is totally different from that of the 
Tokugawa era (1600—1868). Almost nothing remains unchang­
ed. Buddhism alone has not changed. ... In Japan’s Bud­
dhism there are no clear signs of modernization. ... It is like 
a kite caught in a tree; it must be made to fly once more.” 
(17:131 and 136)
And Nishitani deplores “the very big gap that exists at present be­
tween the Buddhist organizations and society in general,” and the fact 
that, “in the Buddhist communities one sees everything from within” 
(17:120 and 122).
Regarding the feelings of indifference with which the different sects 
regard one another:
24 Translation taken from “A Buddhist Voice in the Demythologizing Debate,” 
Eastern Buddhist xxiv, 1 (1991), p. 4 (translation by Richard F. Szippl).
25 In Sengo Nippon Seishinshi, p. 341.
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I think that a Buddhist community in the true sense does not 
exist. ... It is not clear where the common root lies out of 
which all the different sects originated. . . . Somewhere along 
the way [the link with] that point of origin has become very 
tenuous. ... I do not think I can call that Buddhism/’ 
(18:173)
Finally, Nishitani points out that there is no * * Buddhist theology” in 
the true sense of the word (as opposed to secularized buddhology and 
the separate doctrinal studies of the individual sects); there is, espe­
cially, no “study of the sangha" (Buddhist “ecclesiology”) (18:171— 
174). Buddhism has, for example, not succeeded in giving a modem 
sense to the oft-repeated expression, “ samsa ra-is-puie land (nirvana)" 
(17:180).
If Nishitani’s critique focuses mainly on the present state of 
(Japanese) Buddhism, it does not restrict itself to that, but is also 
directed against what he considers to be serious flaws in the very 
makeup of Buddhism. To begin with, he more than once suggests that 
one of Buddhism’s present shortcomings has its roots in the very 
nature of the religion. For example, there being no doctrine with 
regard to the sangha is connected with Buddhist doctrine being essen­
tially asocial. Further, he writes:
[In modern times, human beings have become very self- 
aware, and] also in Buddhism “self-knowledge” is fundamen­
tal. Only, in Buddhism, this self-knowledge finds it extremely 
difficult to step into (or link up with) the real world of society 
or history. ... In modem human beings, knowledge of the 
world and self-knowledge originate in an intimate mutual rela­
tionship. For Buddhism, there is a problem in that relation­
ship. An inability to modernize is connected with the fact that 
self-knowledge and world-knowledge are kept apart. (17:174)
Simply stated, Nishitani’s critique can be said to have found two basic 
formulations. The first is couched in traditional Buddhist terms: Bud­
dhism faces a life-and-death struggle in the gap that exists between ho 
(Dharma) and nin (the human being with its social and historical 
character), and in the tendency to explain everything from the side of 
the Dharma, in disregard of nzn. To remedy this, it is necessary to 
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recognize the historical character of the Dharma and to follow, first of 
all, the path that leads from nin to hd. The second formulation is a 
more common one: “ Buddhism is extremely otherworldly, refusing to 
enter into the various affairs of human society, politics, economics. . . . 
From this, one gets the impression that it is somewhat insufficient to 
probe human life deeply and thoroughly” (17:230-231). In another 
context, Nishitani articulated that critique into three points, from the 
viewpoint of modernity:
1. “Is not it true that Buddhism has no ethics’*—an ethics capable of 
becoming a creative force to shape a new economics, new politics, etc.? 
(17:141; further: 157-163).
2. There is no problematics of history, no historical consciousness, 
in Buddhism (17:142; further: 154-155).
3. Buddhism has not yet confronted science and technology (17:148- 
150).
All these decidedly strong criticisms, however, do not belie, but are 
rather added proof of, the fact that Nishitani never ceased investing 
high hopes in the Buddhism which he tried to “whip into life again.” 
In Buddhism he also saw and highlighted strong points, which he con* 
sidered indispensable for the religion of the future and which more 
often than not appear to correspond to weak points in Christianity. 
Buddhism (and especially Zen), therefore, has a high destiny, an impor­
tant mission in the future.
Suzuki Daisetz’s motivation in his propagation of Zen in the 
West was his conviction that, in the future, Zen would have a 
great significance for the people of the world . . . and he was 
not mistaken in this. Even I, who have only practiced Zen to a 
small degree, can see that. (18:17)
For a short overview of the strong points Nishitani finds in Buddhism, 
we can list the following:
In Buddhism, we find “a self-awareness of the human being in the 
form of a self-awareness of non-ego.” Buddhism can thereby over­
come human self-centeredness and solve the dilemma of Christian 
theocentrism, which does not really return to the human subject, and 
self-centered anthropocentrism (17:86-87).
Buddhism is not burdened to the same degree as Christianity with
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(partly mythological) dogmas. Zen, in particular, is “free” on this 
point.
What drove Suzuki Daisetz to propagate Zen was that he 
recognized the great significance of a trait of Zen that is not to 
be found in any other religion, namely the fact that Zen has 
no dogma of any kind. (21:114)
Buddhism has the advantage of having a strong “principle of de- 
substantialization” in its standpoint of non-ego or emptiness.
Although in actual fact it has not yet confronted science, Buddhism 
contains a standpoint that is able to provide a basis for both religion 
and science (17:89).
The Buddhist vision of the ‘equality of all things’ on the 
highest level [all things having Buddha-nature] resolves, on 
the one hand, the dilemma of science reducing the human to 
the lowest equality of all things and, on the other hand, 
metaphysics and religion which connect only the human with 
the divine. It can thus integrate the standpoint of science into 
a religious vision that upholds the nature and dignity of the 
human. (14:3-39)
In Zen Nishitani finds two more elements that are sorely needed by 
present-day people. “More than anything else, it is Zen that teaches 
that stillness which is lacking in the busyness of present-day life’’ 
(18:22). “When one enters Zen, one must throw one’s knowledge 
away, become naked, and return to ‘square one* [the simple fact of be­
ing alive] ... in order to find bottom under one’s feet. . . . Precisely 
in that point lies the great significance Zen has for the present” (18:18- 
19).
III. Nishitani and the Interreligious Dialogue
It will be a dialogue, not in heaven but rather in hell. If it is not, 
religion itself will not be saved. And if religion is not saved, then 
what other path would there be to save humanity and the world? 
(18:62)
In Nishitani’s vision there is no salvation for humankind except 
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through religion; no single religion in its traditional form is able to 
meet the needs of present humanity; all traditional religions, specifical­
ly Christianity and Buddhism (the only ones he wrote about), have 
deep flaws; moreover, the weak points of Christianity in many cases 
correspond to strong points in Buddhism, and vice versa. Therefore, 
the only possible hope for the future appears to lie in the encounter and 
mutual enrichment of Christianity and Buddhism.
A clearer blueprint for the urgent necessity of the Buddhist-Christian 
dialogue is hard to imagine. No wonder Nishitani was a staunch pro­
moter of that dialogue, not only in his writings, but also as an active 
participant in related organizations. But, of course, here also he re­
mained true to his nature—meaning that he went straight to the crux 
of the matter and came up with the most radical conclusions possible.
Nishitani devoted much thought to the staggering difficulties of the 
dialogue. He narrowed the problem down to two main points. First, 
really encountering another religion implies “recognizing that there is 
a religion that exists besides one’s own,” and therefore being aware of 
the relativity of one’s own. That is not easy for religions that have tradi­
tionally considered themselves in absolute terms. “The encounter is 
very difficult since both possess their own different ‘worlds,’ and both 
have developed into world religions, universal religions that, in a sense, 
cover the totality of the human” (18:121 and 124). What makes the 
situation almost “hopelessly difficult” is the fact that both religions 
have developed doctrinal systems, whereby their religious ideas have ac­
quired a fixed form and developed an unshakable self-confidence 
(14:54).
The second point lies in the difficulty people in general have in “un­
derstanding the other, because it requires entering the other’s ways of 
thinking, feeling, and intending. . . . That difficulty becomes nearly in­
surmountable when it comes to a spiritual realm that lies near the inner­
most inner sanctum of the human heart” (14:54). Nevertheless, if we re­
ally want to meet, nothing more superficial will do. “To open a path to 
mutual understanding, we must descend deep into that realm of faith 
and doctrine, because that realm is, after all, the profoundest level 
humanity has been able to reach” (14:55).
Nishitani closes off, right from the beginning, the tempting path of 
easy compromise in a cozy atmosphere of mutual friendship. “The first
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requirement is that both make clear and uphold . . . their own par­
ticularity. Otherwise we come to a hybrid product that is neither one 
nor the other. If each does not bring its strong points into play, the 
whole exercise is meaningless” (18:125). He insists on the “cutting 
edge” the dialogue must have in order to be authentic. “We call it 
dialogue, but it is like two samurai crossing swords” (18:55). 
Moreover, just as he has insisted that “the religious communities must 
step out of themselves, to stand in the same place as ordinary people” 
(17:131), he now declares:
The common “place” where Buddhism and Christianity can 
talk is the world of historical reality that both of them are con­
fronting. . . . Even the confrontation of the traditional doc­
trines of the two religions must also occur on the basis of the 
actual situation of the present world. It must not be an in­
house discussion. . . . It is necessary to dialogue on the stand­
point of the task that is imposed on both religions: to do 
something about the problems of present society . . . prob­
lems for which both carry responsibility, were it only by the 
fact that they were not able to prevent them. . . . (18:128 and 
130)
This might at first sight give the impression that Nishitani is of the same 
opinion as those present-day theologians who suggest that the meeting 
place of the religions lies in their common concern and activity for 
justice in the world. But, this should not be taken to suggest that work­
ing for the good of society is the only substance of religion or that, in 
that joined activity, each religion can safely rest on its own doctrinal 
position, because that would be at the opposite pole from Nishitani’s 
position. For, on this point we encounter again, as intimated already, a 
prime example of the radicality of Nishitani’s analyses and of the 
demands he makes on the religions.
After having stated that, in the encounter, we cannot shelve our doc­
trinal differences, but must “descend deep into the realm of faith and 
doctrine,” Nishitani points out:
However, on that level an encounter cannot really occur for, 
when it comes to faith and doctrine, even “world religions,” 
no matter how open they are within their own sphere, are
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closed to other religions. . . . Therefore, after having reached 
that level, we must go beyond it to a still deeper level, and 
look there for the possibility of encounter and mutual under­
standing in the true sense. . . . This will probably be a totally 
new level. Today, we face a severe demand: that of going 
beyond even the spiritual forms and norms that lie in the 
innermost core of ourselves, to break through the settled 
frameworks of doctrine and theology ... to return to the 
original “self** beyond all doctrines ... the level where the 
human is merely human, or simply a “son of man” . . . 
barefooted and empty-handed. (14:55-56)
This, of course, requires the paradoxical attitude of retaining utmost 
loyalty to one’s religion while letting go of it. Nishitani, detecting that 
attitude in the Zen tradition, uses the terminology of Zen to describe it. 
In one place, he refers to the spirit of “butsukojo” (roughly, “going 
beyond Buddha”), “while basing oneself on Buddha, distancing 
oneself from the Buddha” (18:146). In another passage, he explains 
this same attitude using a thorough analysis of words by Rinzai (Lin- 
chi), “While being on the road, not being away from home” (18:53- 
58).
But what does this have to do with taking the actual world as the 
place of the dialogue? Here, Nishitani launches a really breathtaking 
idea, which I might attempt to formulate as follows. The present unity 
of the world (the “one world**) has been brought about by science and 
secularization. Also religious unity in this one world can only originate 
in that same source. It is by fully adopting that secularly that we shall 
be enabled to assume the paradoxical standpoint that our present 
predicament requires. But here again, it is better to let Nishitani tell 
this in his own words.
This possibility [of penetrating deeper than one’s own 
religion and meeting the other there] is contained in the 
selfsame basic historical situation which at present makes the 
encounter of Buddhism and Christianity necessary. Namely, 
in the fact that the present world as a whole is rapidly becom­
ing “one world.” . . . The universal situation of the present 
has been made possible only by the process of secularization, 
whereby all the realms of human activity have been eman-
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cipated one by one from the shackles of religious doctrines 
and theologies that have long dominated them. Today, by 
their doctrines and theologies, the religions have been set 
apart in an isolated position in the world: closed in them­
selves, they form the only exception to the unifying trend of 
the world.
In such a situation, the only possible path for a true en­
counter and mutual understanding of East and West on the 
deepest level of human existence is to expose oneself boldly, 
radically, to the complicated situation of the actual world, 
and to find in the midst thereof a new point of departure. 
This means to enter deeply, gropingly, into the bottom of hu­
man existence and to arrive there at the hidden origin, the 
source wherein the emergence of the present “one world,” 
with its radical and universal secularization of human life, 
originated . . .
To expose ourselves boldly to that situation of the pres­
ent world will mean that each of us will become in the most 
simple and radical way a “son of man” who has nowhere to 
lay his head. . . .
Today, if we do not descend to that level, no real en­
counter—with other religions, and even with Jesus—is possi­
ble. (14:57-58)
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